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Abstract
While group lending has attracted a lot of attention, the impact of collusion on the
performance of group lending contracts has remained unclear, particularly in moral haz-
ard environments. This paper uses a simple model, with risk-neutral agents and limited
liability, to clarify this issue and distinguish entrepreneursinformation sharing from col-
lusion. Lending e¢ ciency is enhanced when entrepreneurs mutually observe their e¤orts
but reduced when they can collude: lenders thus do not benet from collusion; rather,
information-sharing among the entrepreneurs improves lending even if the entrepreneurs
collude but lenders can do even better and actually achieve the rst best if the entre-
preneurs observe each others e¤orts and do not collude.
When entrepreneurs observe each others e¤orts and collude perfectly simple group
lending contracts, based only on realized outputs, are optimal and outperform individual
contracts. More sophisticated contracts which use revelation mechanisms to elicit e¤ort
levels are thus not useful. This result remains true when agents have only noisy signals
of each others e¤orts; however, the e¤ectiveness of group lending contracts increases
with the informativeness of the signals. Finally, group lending contracts can help provide
monitoring incentives when monitoring the other entrepreneurs e¤ort entails a cost, but
become ine¤ective when the cost of monitoring is too high, so that the bank must resort
to individual contracts.
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1 Introduction
The development of group lending through the Grameen Bank and similar institutions
has attracted the interest of all those who believe that lending to the poor is a useful step
to exit the vicious circle of underdevelopment. The empirical evaluation of the success
of these new ways of lending to entrepreneurs who have no collateral is still subject to
debate (see Khandker, Khalily and Kham (1995), Morduch (1997), Pitt and Khandker
(1996)).
Theorists have proposed various explanations for the new opportunities provided by
group lending.3 They can help solve adverse selection problems,4 monitor repayments to
avoid strategic default,5 or solve moral hazard problems.6
Various di¢ culties encountered by group lending have been pointed out in the lit-
erature. These mechanisms often impose various costs such as attending weekly group
meetings (Morduch (1997)), may increase default probabilities for the entire group when
some members run into di¢ culties (Besley and Coate (1995)), may induce excessively
prudent behavior (Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1992)), may be less exible than in-
dividual lending in growing businesses (Madajewicz (1996), Woolcock (1996)).
The impact of collusion on the performance of group lending, however, remains unclear.
When adverse selection is the issue, NGuessan and La¤ont (2000) and La¤ont (2003) show
that group lending is often an e¢ cient way to deal with collusion threats and even that
group lending is really justied by such collusion threats. In the moral hazard literature,
the dominant theme is instead that, when agents collude, mutual observation of each
others e¤orts improves welfare (Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), Itoh (1993)).7
This paper reconsiders the issue of collusion in moral hazard models with several (ac-
tually two) agents (entrepreneurs). Section 2 presents the basic model, with risk-neutral
entrepreneurs that have limited liability, and studies the performance of individual con-
tracts. Section 3 uses this model to review in a simple way the main results of the literature
of group lending with moral hazard. We rst note that group lending contracts are not
e¤ective when entrepreneurs do not observe each others e¤ort levels. And when entre-
preneurs do observe each others e¤ort, simple group lending contracts (i.e., without
3See Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for a survey.
4See Ghatak (1997), Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (1998), La¤ont and NGuessan (2000), La¤ont
(1999).
5See Besley and Coate (1995), Besley and Jain (1994), Armendariz de Aghion (1999), Rai and Sjöström
(2000).
6Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), Itoh (1991), (1993), Conning (1997).
7This literature appears as a special case of a more general literature on moral hazard within a
principal-agents framework where agents observe each others e¤orts (Itoh (1993), Holmström and Mil-
grom (1990) and Baliga and Sjöström (1998)).
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any communication or revelation mechanisms) are dominated by revelation mechanisms,
which achieve the rst-best, when entrepreneurs do not collude. However, when instead
entrepreneurs collude perfectly, a simple group lending contract is optimal. Section 4
shows that the fact that communication and revelation mechanisms are not useful when
agents collude is quite robust: this result remains valid when collusion takes the form
of side-contracting with an informed or uninformed third party, when entrepreneurs do
not perfectly oberve each others e¤orts, and when monitoring the other entrepreneur is
moderately costly. Section 5 concludes.
2 Individual contracts
An entrepreneur wishes to carry out a project that costs 1 and generates an out-
put z > 0 in case of success and 0 otherwise. The probability of success depends on
whether the entrepreneur provides e¤ort: providing e¤ort generates a private cost c for
the entrepreneur but increases the probability of success from p > 0 to p > p.
The entrepreneur has no wealth; he must borrow to invest and can only repay his loan
if he succeeds. Denoting by x the entrepreneurs share of output, his expected utility is8
px  c if he exerts e¤ort
px if he exerts no e¤ort.
Funds are supplied by a prot-maximizing monopolistic bank which has a cost of funds
r. For simplicity we assume that investment is socially valuable only if the entrepreneur
exerts e¤ort:
pz   c > r > pz: (2.1)
It follows that the bank seeks to induce e¤ort (or does not lend); it must therefore solve:
max
x0
p (z   x)  r
px  c  px; (IC)
px  c  0: (PC)
The incentive constraint (IC) asserts that the entrepreneur prefers to exert e¤ort rather
than not, while the participation constraint (PC) asserts that the entrepreneurs expected
utility is higher than his outside opportunity utility level, normalized to 0.
Since the entrepreneur has no wealth (x  0), the entrepreneur can only be rewarded
and not be punished; the incentive constraint (IC) is therefore more stringent than the
8The lender could make an additional transfer to the entrepreneur when the project fails, but this
would reduce the entrepreneurs incentives and is never optimal; for the sake of presentation, and without
loss of generality, we will ignore this possibility.
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participation constraint and is obviously binding:
x = x  c
p  p: (2.2)
To induce e¤ort the bank must therefore give up an expected rent
R =
pc
p  p   c =
pc
p  p: (2.3)
It follows that the bank grants a loan less often than socially desirable: granting a loan
requires the value of the investment pz to be strictly larger than the social cost c + r,
in order to cover the rent R that must be left to the entrepreneur for incentive reasons.
Thus, whenever R > pz   (c+ r) (> 0), socially valuable projects do not get nanced.9
Decreasing the minimal rent to be left to the entrepreneurs would thus make e¢ cient
lending more likely. We now explore how group lending can indeed decrease this minimal
rent and therefore improve the e¢ ciency of lending.
3 Group lending
We now suppose that two entrepreneurs can each carry a project with the same char-
acteristics as above; we show in this context that group contracting can improve the
e¢ ciency of lending.
3.1 Private information
Suppose rst that the entrepreneurs do not observe each others e¤orts. Consider
then a group lending contract (xi; yi) which species for entrepreneur i a payment xi if
his partner j succeeds, and a payment yi if instead his partner fails.
To induce a Nash equilibrium where each entrepreneur exerts e¤ort, the contract must
satisfy the incentive constraint:
pXi   c  pXi: (3.4)
where Xi  [pxi + (1  p) yi] denotes the expected payment to entrepreneur i in case of
success. Since this incentive constraint has the same form as (IC), the expected payment
(and thus the expected rent left to each entrepreneur) must be as large as with individual
contracts. Therefore, group lending does not perform better than individual loan contracts
when entrepreneurs do not observe each others e¤orts.10
9This would be the case even if the banking sector were perfectly competitive: because of incentive
problems, the "pledgeable income" pz  R does not allow lenders in that case to recoup the investment
cost c+ r.
10This result parallels theorem 1 in Itoh (1993) and Varian (1990).
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3.2 Shared information
So, group lending can be e¤ective only if it relies on more information among entre-
preneurs. Let us therefore consider the other polar case, where the two entrepreneurs
observe perfectly each others e¤ort levels. This additional information does not, in itself,
a¤ect the Nash behavior of the entrepreneurs  in the absence of communication with
the bank, the above individual contracts would remain optimal. However, the bank may
now try to obtain this shared information through revelation mechanisms. We rst stress
that these mechanisms would be indeed quite e¤ective in the absence of collusion among
entrepreneurs, but note that collusion limits their e¤ectiveness.
Proposition 1 When entrepreneurs observe each others e¤ort levels and behave non-
cooperatively, the bank can achieve the complete information optimum.
Proof. Consider the following mechanism, inspired from Nash subgame perfect imple-
mentation (Moore and Repullo (1988), Ma (1988)), to be played after the e¤orts have
been undertaken, but before output is realized:
 Entrepreneur 2 is asked to reveal whether entrepreneur 1 provided e¤ort
 If entrepreneur 2 reports that entrepreneur 1 exerted e¤ort, entrepreneur 1 gets
c and entrepreneur 1 gets 0;
 If entrepreneur 2 claims 1 did not exert e¤ort, entrepreneur 1 gets 0 while
entrepreneur 2 receives b, but must pay a penalty a if entrepreneur 1 succeeds.
 A similar revelation game is then played for entrepreneur 2s e¤ort.
Choosing a and b such that pa < b < pa,11 entrepreneur 2 truthfully reports entre-
preneur 1s e¤ort. Anticipating this, entrepreneur 1 is willing to exert e¤ort. The same
applies to entrepreneur 2s e¤ort.
Thus, in the absence of collusion, a revelation mechanism allows the bank to achieve
the rst-best, without any group lending feature. As we show below, it is only the threat
of collusion that makes group lending relevant.12
11Imposing a penalty may conict with wealth constraints. However, both a and b can be chosen
arbitrarily small. Furthermore, these penalties are expected ones, so that there is no conict with ex post
limited liability constraints: a can be implemented as a small penalty imposed on entrepreneur 2 when
he succeeds.
12See La¤ont (2003) for the same insight in adverse selection environments with correlated types.
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3.3 Shared information and collusion
The revelation mechanisms used to extract the entrepreneursinformation are however
generally not robust to collusion. Suppose for example that the entrepreneurs can per-
fectly collude and maximize the total sum of their utilities (we show in the next section
that they can easily achieve this if they can side-contract with an even uninformed third
party).
Note rst that the contract used in the proof of Proposition 1 is obviously no longer
operative when entrepreneurs can costlessly collude in this way, since they would then
agree not to provide e¤ort and claim that they did. Now, suppose that the bank o¤ers
contracts that eventually lead both entrepreneurs to exert e¤ort, and denote by x the
resulting expected payment (per entrepreneur) when both projects succeed, and by y the
expected payment (per entrepreneur) when only one project succeeds. On average, each
entrepreneur thus gets
u  p2x+ p (1  p) y   c:
One possible alternative for the entrepreneurs is to exert no e¤ort and stick to the same
messages as before. On average, each entrepreneur would thus get
u^  p2x+ p  1  p y:
For the entrepreneurs to exert e¤ort, it must therefore be the case that u  u^. Maximizing
the banks expected prot (per entrepreneur)
p2 (z   x) + p (1  p) (z   y)  r
subject to the necessary condition u  u^ and x; y  0 would yield
x = x  c
p2   p2 ; (3.5)
y = 0; (3.6)
leaving each entrepreneur with a rent
R  p2 c
p2   p2   c =
p2c
p2   p2 ;
which is positive, although smaller than the rent R =
pc
p p needed to induce high levels
of e¤ort with individual loan contracts.13
It turns out that a simple group lending contract can precisely achieve this result.
Specically, consider the following contract:
13
p2c
p2   p2 =
p
p+ p
pc
p  p <
pc
p  p :
6
 each entrepreneur gets a payment x if both projects succeed and nothing otherwise,
and
 no communication is required.
By construction, this contract satises the entrepreneursparticipation constraint and
the entrepreneurs jointly prefer the situation where they both provide e¤ort to the situa-
tion where none of them provides any e¤ort. Last, if only one of them provides e¤ort, on
average each entrepreneur gets
ppx  c
2
;
which is less attractive than what they get by both providing e¤ort.14 Hence, it is in the
entrepreneursjoint interest to accept the contract and provide e¤ort. We thus have:
Proposition 2 When entrepreneurs observe each others e¤ort levels and can perfectly
collude, a simple group lending contract (in which the entrepreneurs receive a payment
only when both projects succeed, and there is no communication) is optimal.
This proposition parallels theorem 5 in Itoh (1993). Note also that collusion does not
a¤ect the entrepreneursbehavior when the bank only o¤ers individual contracts.15 There-
fore, the proposition implies that simple group lending contracts improve on individual
loan contracts:
Corollary 3 When entrepreneurs observe each others e¤ort levels and can perfectly col-
lude, group lending is more protable for the bank and more e¢ cient than individual
lending.
The better performance of group lending contracts comes from the fact that rewarding
the entrepreneurs success with sharesin the other entrepreneurs project generates ad-
ditional incentives to exert e¤ort when the two entrepreneurs coordinate their decisions.16
When R < pz   (c+ r), group lending allows the bank to reduce the rent left to the
14Indeed,
ppx   c
2
< p2x   c, c
2
< p
 
p  px = pc
p+ p
;
which is trivially satised since p > p.
15This observation relies however on the risk-neutrality assumption. If entrepreneurs were risk-averse,
even with individual loan contracts they would have an incentive to share risks through side-contracting,
which in turn would a¤ect their incentives to exert e¤ort.
16This better performance of group lending contracts is reminiscent of the diversication benets
already emphasized by Diamond (1984) in an audit framework: in the moral hazard framework considered
here, as in Diamonds context, it is indeed easier to nance an entrepreneur who has two independent
projects, than two independent entrepreneurs with one project each.
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entrepreneurs; if instead R < pz   (c+ r) < R, then group lending allows the bank to
nance projects which could not be nanced with individual loan contracts.17
4 Robustness
The result obtained so far is that, when the entrepreneurs observe each others and
collude perfectly (i.e., can behave as a single entity), the optimal contract is a simple
group lending contract that does not require any revelation mechanism or communication
between the bank and the entrepreneurs. In Section 4.1, we show that even if side-
contracting by the entrepreneurs is limited by their wealth constraints, collusion can still
be perfect if they can side-contract with a benevolent (even uniformed) third party.
In Section 4.2, we extend our result to the case where each entrepreneur observes only
a noisy signal of the other entrepreneurs e¤ort. Again, the optimal contract does not
require any exchange of messages.18
In Section 4.3, we introduce costly monitoring of e¤orts and show that group lending
contracts remain optimal if these costs are not too high; otherwise, mutual observation
breaks down and individual contracts are the only option.
4.1 Modeling of collusion
We have assumed so far that the entrepreneurs could perfectly collude and maximize
their joint surplus. Two di¢ culties may arise, however. First, limited liability imposes
restrictions on side-transfers. Second, if they want to rely on a third party to enforce
their side-contracts, they need to convey the information about their e¤orts to that third
party. We now show that the entrepreneurs can indeed overcome these di¢ culties. By
redistributing between them the payments they receive from the bank, the entrepreneurs
can indeed share their joint surplus in any way they want; and through simple revelation
mechanisms à la Ma or Moore, the entrepreneurs can report truthfully to a third party
their mutual observation of e¤orts despite the constraints imposed by their limited wealth.
To explore the scope for collusion in more detail, we consider the following framework:
 rst, the bank o¤ers contracts; these contracts can stipulate (possibly sequential) re-
ports on each others e¤ort levels, once e¤orts have been chosen and before outcomes
17As noted above, group lending would improve lending e¢ ciency in that case even if the banking
sector were competitive
18The Baliga-Sjöström (1998) model where only one agent observes the e¤ort of the other is a special
case with the slight di¤erence that agents choose their e¤ort levels sequentially. They show that the
optimal contract never requires communication.
8
are realized and the sharing rules can be made contingent on those reports.
 second, the entrepreneurs sign a side-contract with a third party; this contract can
also stipulate reports on the e¤orts and provide for payments (transfers from one
entrepreneur to the other, or to the third party), based on these reports as well as
on the reports to the bank;19
 third, the entrepreneurs choose their levels of e¤ort;
 fourth, entrepreneurs play the revelation game generated by the contract signed
with the bank;
 fth, the entrepreneurs play the revelation game generated by the side contract;
 nally, outcomes are realized and payments are made; payments stipulated by
the contract with the bank have senior priority over those stipulated by the side-
contract.
We have:
Proposition 4 Side-contracting with an informed third party (who observes the e¤ort
levels) or with an uninformed third party allows the entrepeneurs to maximize their joint
utility and to share it in any individually rational way.
Proof. Fix the contracts o¤ered by the bank and let
 (u1; u2) denote the expected levels of utility that the entrepreneurs would get in the
absence of a side-contract if they behave non-cooperatively in stages 3 and 4, and
 u denote the maximal sum of expected utilities that the entrepreneurs could get in
the absence of a side-contract, by coordinating their strategies in stages 3 and 4.
We now show that, for any (u^1; u^2) satisfying u^1 + u^2 = u and u^i  ui, i = 1; 2,
there exists a side-contract that induces the entrepreneurs to behave (non-cooperatively)
in stages 3 and 4 so as to get exactly the expected levels of utility u^1 and u^2. We focus
on the case of an uninformed third party side-contracts can only be even more e¤ective
when the third party, too, observes the entrepreneurse¤orts.
19We thus assume for simplicity that reports to the bank are public; we believe that the analysis could
further be extended to the case where the two entrepreneurs, but not the third party, observe any message
to the bank the side-contract should then simply induce the entrepreneurs to report these messages as
well to the third party.
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By construction, u  u1+u2 (the entrepreneurs can always mimic the non-cooperative
equilibrium) and ui  0 (having no wealth, each entrepreneur can secure at least 0 by
not providing e¤ort). Therefore, by rst transferring all payments from the bank to the
third party and then redistributing these payments between them, the entrepreneurs can
indeed achieve any individually rational sharing of the pieu. Now, let (1; 

2) denote
the (coordinated) strategies used in stages 3 and 4 (including the private e¤ort decisions
(e1; e

2) and all public messages (m

1;m

2) e¤ectively sent to the bank) that would generate
u in the absence of a side contract, and (u1; u

2) denote the corresponding expected levels
of utility.
Consider the following side-contract. First, all payments go to the third party, who
then distributes them as follows. If the messages sent to bank di¤er from (m1;m

2), the
entrepreneurs get nothing. In addition:
 Stage 1:
Entrepreneur 2 is asked to report entrepreneur 1s e¤ort level to the third party;
 If entrepreneur 2 reports that 1 provided the appropriate e¤ort e1, 2 gets
nothing at that stage while 1 gets payments so as to obtain utility u^1;
Otherwise, entrepreneur 1 gets nothing but while entrepreneur 2 receives an
amount a but pays b if entrepreneur 1 succeeds, where the lottery (a; b) is
chosen so that entrepreneur 2 prefers reporting the true e¤ort level rather than
facing the lottery.20
 Stage 2 is similarly designed to elicit entrepreneur 1s e¤ort level.
This side-contract clearly induces the entrepreneurs to send the required messages
(m1;m

2) and ensures that each entrepreneur truthfully reports the other entrepreneurs
e¤ort; anticipating this, each entrepreneur i chooses the appropriate e¤ort ei .
The only problem might be to implement the payments a and b when needed, because
of the entrepreneurswealth constraints. However, both a and b can be chosen arbitrarily
small and they only need to be made in expected terms. Hence, whenever there are gains
from collusion (i.e., u  u1+ u2) and those gains are shared (even very asymmetrically),
both entrepreneurs should be in position to pay an arbitrarily small penalty (since then
u^i > ui  0 ).
20If for example entrepreneur 1 is supposed to exert e¤ort, than a and b should be chosen so that
pb > a > pb. Then, if 1 indeed exerts e¤ort, 2 prefers to report the truth (and get 0) rather than lying
and facing the lottery (which would give him a  pb < 0); and if instead 2 does not exert e¤ort, 2 prefers
again reporting the truth (and get a   pb > 0) rather than pretending 1 exerted e¤ort. Inverting the
sign of the payments (or reverting the roles of the xed payment a and the contingent payment b) would
again induce truthtelling when entrepreneur 1 is supposed not to exert e¤ort.
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4.2 Noisy observation of e¤ort levels
We have shown so far that there is no scope for revelation mechanisms when entre-
preneurs observe perfectly each others e¤orts but collude. We show in this section that
this insight generalizes to situations where entrepreneurs imperfectly observe the others
e¤ort. While this imperfect observation reduces the e¢ ciency of incentive mechanisms, it
is still the case that the optimal mechanism does not need to require the entrepreneurs
to report any information they may have about realized e¤orts.
To x ideas, suppose that entrepreneur j does not observe entrepreneur is e¤ort level
itself, but only a signal i, which can take two values,  or . The signal is informative in
the sense that a higher e¤ort increases from  to  the probability of receiving a high
signal .
No collusion. Suppose rst that the entrepreneurs cannot collude. In the absence
of any collusion, it is straightforward to elicit any entrepreneurs information about the
others e¤ort: on the one hand, the received signal is payo¤ irrelevant for the entrepreneur,
who is thus willing to report it as long as it does not impact his own remuneration; and on
the other hand, if the signal were publicly available the optimal contract would not make
one entrepreneurs payment contingent on the signal relative to the other entrepreneurs
e¤ort. Hence, the contract that would be optimal if the signals were public is readily
implementable when these signals are privately observed by the entrepreneurs.
Without loss of generality, we can furthermore restrict attention to contracts where
each entrepreneur gets a positive share of his output, x, if and only the project is successful
and the other entrepreneur reports a high signal:
Proposition 5 The optimal contract consists in asking each entrepreneur to report his
signal about the others e¤ort and to leave a positive share of output only if the reported
signal is high.
Proof. We rst characterize the optimal contract assuming that signals are publicly
available and then show that this contract can easily be implemented, as noted above. For
notational purpose, let 1refer to successor high signaland 0to failureor low
signal.The most general contract species for each entrepreneur21 a payment which can
depend on the signal about his e¤ort, on the entrepreneurs success and on the other entre-
preneurs success. However, since the expected utility of an entrepreneur is independent
of the other entrepreneurs e¤ort, we can simply index the payments to the entrepreneurs,
xij, on the signal about his e¤ort (i = 0 or 1) and on his success (j = 0 or 1). To induce a
21While in principle contracts could be individualized, the analysis below shows that the optimal
contract is symmetric (or anonymous).
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Nash equilibrium of high e¤ort levels, the contract must satisfy the incentive constraint:
p

x11 +
 
1   x01+ (1  p) x10 +  1   x00  c
 p x11 +  1   x01+  1  p x10 +  1   x00 ;
or 
p   p x11 + p  1    p  1  x01
+

(1  p)     1  p x10 + (1  p)  1     1  p  1  x00  c;
The last coe¢ cient is negative, since project failure and low signal are both indicative
of low e¤ort. Hence, since the bank seeks to minimize the payments to the entrepreneurs,
x00 = 0. Next, consider a transfer from x10 to x11. To maintain incentive compatibility,
a reduction in x10 of " must be compensated by an increase in x11 of
(1  p)     1  p 
p   p ";
the impact on the expected payment to the entrepreneur is then
p
(1  p)     1  p 
p   p "  (1  p) " =
241  1 p1 p 
1  p
p
35 (1  p) " < 0;
where the inequality stems from p > p.
So it is possible to decrease the rent of the entrepreneur while still maintaining incentive
compatibility (and therefore participation). Then the bank gains by setting x10 to 0. And
similarly for x01. Hence it is optimal for the bank to leave a positive share of output to
the entrepreneur only when his project is successful and the signal about his e¤ort is high.
The optimal contract for the bank leaves a share x to the entrepreneur that is just
su¢ cient to maintain the incentive to exert e¤ort: 
p   p x11  c;
or
x11 = x^ =
c
p   p :
The entrepreneurs expected rent is given by
R^ = p
c
p   p   c =
pc
p   p =
c
p
p
  1
;
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this rent is positive but lower than in the absence of any signal, and it decreases as the
signal becomes more informative (that is, as = increases).
Collusion. If the entrepreneurs can collude, they will always coordinate the reports
they send to the bank so as to maximize their joint utility whatever the signal they
receive about the others e¤ort, since the realized signal has not impact on their utilities.22
Hence, the bank has no hope to receive any useful information about realized signals. Note
that the argument applies as well to the case where both entrepreneurs observe the realized
signals as to the case where signal i is only observed by entrepreneur j.
Colluding on e¤ort levels is now more di¢ cult, however. In particular, if the entre-
preneurs rely on a third party to enforce side-contracts, this third party must construct
an incentive scheme that induces the entrepreneurs to choose their jointly best levels of
e¤ort; this, in turn, requires the entrepreneurs to communicate the signals they receive.
We can show that this communication is easy to implement; as a result, the entrepreneurs
can indeed coordinate their e¤ort levels, provided however that each entrepreneur gets a
minimal rent. To see this in more detail, consider the following framework:
 rst, the bank o¤ers contracts, which can rely on (possibly sequential) reports on
realized signals, before outcomes are realized.
 second, the entrepreneurs sign a side-contract with a third party; this contract
can also stipulate reports on signals and provide for payments (transfers from one
entrepreneur to the other, or to the third party), based on these reports as well as
on the reports to the bank;
 third, the entrepreneurs choose their levels of e¤ort;
 fourth, each entrepreneur observes a signal about the other entrepreneurs e¤orts;23
 fth, entrepreneurs play the revelation game generated by the contract signed with
the bank;
 sixth, the entrepreneurs play the revelation game generated by the side contract;
 nally, outcomes are realized and payments are made; payments stipulated by
the contract with the bank have senior priority over those stipulated by the side-
contract.
We have:
22In particular the signals do not a¤ect the entrepreneursbeliefs about each others e¤orts and therefore
do not a¤ect either their perceived probability of success.
23As already noted, whether each signal is observed by one or both entrepreneurs does not a¤ect the
analysis.
13
Proposition 6 Side-contracting with an informed third party (who observes the signals
about the e¤ort levels) or with an uninformed third party allows the entrepeneurs to max-
imize their joint utility and to share it in any individually rational way that gives a rent
at least equal to R^ to each entrepreneur who must exert e¤ort.
Proof. Fix the contracts o¤ered by the bank to induce e¤ort and let
 (u1; u2) denote the expected levels of utility that the entrepreneurs would get in the
absence of a side-contract if they behave non-cooperatively in stages 3 and 5, and
 u denote the maximal sum of expected utilities that the entrepreneurs could get
by coordinating their strategies in stages 3 and 5 and, for each entrepreneur, let
R^i = R^ if the entrepreneur must exert e¤ort to achieve u and R^i = 0 otherwise.
We now show that, for any (u^1; u^2) satisfying u^1 + u^2 = u and u^i  max
n
ui; R^i
o
,
i = 1; 2, there exists a side-contract that induces the entrepreneurs to behave (non-
cooperatively) in stages 3 and 4 so as to get exactly the expected levels of utility u^1 and
u^2.
Denote by (e1; e

2) the e¤orts and by (m

1;m

2) the messages required to achieve u

and consider the following type of side contract. Any payment from the bank to any
entrepreneur is transferred to the third party, who then redistributes them as follows;
 the third party keeps all payments for itself if the messages sent by the entrepreneurs
do not coincide with (m1;m

2), otherwise:
 if entrepreneur i is supposed not to exert e¤ort, the third party simply gives entre-
preneur i a xed payment wi
 otherwise, the third party asks entrepreneur j to report the signal he observed
about entrepreneur is e¤ort and then makes to entrepreneur i a payment of the
form wi + x^ij, where
wi is constant, and
 x^ij is either 0 (if entrepreneur i is supposed not to exert e¤ort) or the payments
of the optimal incentive scheme for public signals (that is, if entrepreneur i is
supposed to exert e¤ort, xij = x^ if the project is successful and the other
entrepreneur reports a high signal to the third party, and xij = 0 otherwise);
According to this side contract, the enterpreneurs payo¤ is only based on the entre-
preneurs own performance and on the signal reported to the third party by the other
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entrepreneur. Each entrepreneur is thus willing to report thruthfully the signal he ob-
serves to the third party, and this contract then induces the entrepreneurs to choose the
appropriate e¤ort levels. Last, there indeed exists non-negative payments (w1; w2) im-
plementing (u^1; u^2) whenever u^i  R^i and both entrepreneurs are willing to accept the
side-contract whenever u^i  min ui.
Collusion is thus still possible in spite of the di¢ culties mentioned above, with one
caveat:
 entrepreneurs can perfectly coordinate their reports to the bank;
 but inducing an entrepreneur to exert e¤ort requires to leave this entrepreneur with
a rent at least equal to the minimal rent needed with public signals

R^

The rst property implies that the bank has no hope to elicit any relevant information
about the signals received: there is thus no scope for revelation mechanisms. The second
property implies in turn that the bank cannot hope to reduce the entrepreneurs rent
below R^ (in other words, here again collusion can only hurt the bank). Note that, from
Proposition 6, entrepreneurs can always coordinate on low e¤ort levels if they wish so.
Therefore, they cannot get a rent lower than R identied in Section 3.2. Building on
these insights, we can show that the optimal contract is a simple group lending contract:
Proposition 7 Whatever the informativeness of the signal, the optimal contract is a
simple group lending contract without any communication or revelation mechanism. In
addition:
 if the signal is su¢ ciently informative

R^ < R

, then the group lending contract
of Section 3.2 (perfect mutual observation) is optimal and induces e¤ort with a rent
R
 if the signal is not so informative

R^ > R

, then a group lending contract where
the entrepreneurs get X^ = 
p
c
p p if and only if both projects succeed is optimal and
induces e¤ort with a rent R^.
Proof. From Proposition 6, there is no scope for revelation mechanisms. Suppose now
that a contract induces the entrepreneurs to coordinate on high e¤ort levels. Since they
could coordinate as well on low e¤ort levels and share any increase in joint utility in
any way they want, it must be the case that their joint utility is higher with high e¤orts
than with low e¤orts. From Section 3.2, this implies that the entrepreneurs cannot get a
rent lower than R each. Proposition 6 further implies that the entrepreneurs will not
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be able to coordinate on high e¤ort levels if they get a rent lower than R^. Consider now
the following group lending contract, where the entrepreneurs get max
n
R^; R
o
=p2 when
both projects succeed precisely. This contract
 gives the entrepreneur the minimal rent max
n
R^; R
o
,
 allows them to coordinate on high e¤ort levels if they wish so (since it provides a
rent at least equal to R^),
 and is such that the entrepreneursjoint utility is maximal when they both exert
e¤ort (since X is at least equal to R=p2).
This contract thus induces the entrepreneurs to coordinate on high e¤ort levels and
minimizes the rent; it is therefore optimal.
This proposition conrms the optimality of simple group lending contracts. First,
the structure of payments, where an entrepreneur gets a positive payment X only when
both projects succeed, enhances both the incentives to provide e¤ort and the incentives
to monitor each other. Second, the payment X must give a rent (p2X) that is su¢ cient
to encourage the entrepreneurs to coordinate on high e¤ort levels (p2X  R) and also
su¢ cient to allow the third party to induce e¤ort

p2X  R^

. The rent R^ decreases
as signals become more and more informative about the entrepreneurs e¤orts. When
signals are su¢ ciently informative

R^ < R

, the bank can actually do as well as if the
entrepreneurs perfectly observed each others e¤orts; because of collusion between the
entrepreneurs, the bank is in this case forced to leave a larger rent

R instead of R^

.
When signals are less informative, however, the bank can only decrease the entrepreneurs
rents down to the level it could achieve if signals were public. It achieves this result
not through revelation mechanisms (the entrepreneurs would always cheat on reported
signals), but instead, through group lending contracts that induce the entrepreneurs to
collude and exert e¤ort. While collusion among entrepreneurs does not harm the bank in
that particular case, it still leads the bank to modify the way it induces the entrepreneurs
to exert e¤ort (through a group lending contract rather than a revelation mechanism).
4.3 Costly monitoring of e¤ort levels
It follows from the above analysis that the bank benets from the entrepreneurs
mutual observation of e¤orts. It may be however costly for the entrepreneurs to monitor
each other. Still, the bank would have an incentive to encourage such mutual monitoring
as long as it is not excessively costly. Suppose for example that each entrepreneur must
incur a cost  for monitoring the others e¤ort. If monitoring is contractible, the bank
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will ask the entrepreneurs to monitor each other as long as the cost of monitoring is lower
than the rent di¤erential ( < R  R). If instead monitoring is not contractible, group
lending contracts can be used to give each entrepreneur an incentive to monitor what the
other is doing and to make sure that he will indeed exert e¤ort. To see this in more
detail, consider for example the following situation:
 rst, the bank o¤ers (group lending) contracts;
 second, the entrepreneurs can sign a side-contract stipulating e¤ort levels and side
transfers;
 third, the entrepreneurs decide whether to observe each others e¤ort; if they do,
they incur a cost ;
 fourth, the entrepreneurs, having observed all previous decisions, choose their e¤ort
levels; if they have incurred the observation cost , they observe each others choices.
It is clear that the entrepreneurs will incur the observation cost  only if they have
entered into a side-contract. Therefore, if they do not sign any side-contract, they will
behave exactly as if their e¤orts were strictly private information, and the best contract
for the bank, among those that do not induce side-contracting, is the optimal individual
loan contract described in Section 2, which leaves each entrepreneur a rent pc=
 
p  p.
The following proposition shows that, when side-contracting and monitoring costs are not
too large, the bank performs better by encouraging the entrepreneurs to coordinate their
e¤ort decisions and the above group lending contract (adjusted for the contracting and
monitoring costs) precisely does so:24
Proposition 8 If side-contracting and monitoring costs satisfy:

c
<
p
p
; (4.7)
then the simple group lending contract

x^ = c+
p2 p2 ; y = 0

is optimal and induces the en-
trepreneurs to side-contract on high e¤orts and monitor each other, while leaving them a
lower rent than individual loan contracts.
Proof. Consider a contract that induces the entrepreneurs to exert e¤ort and to
monitor each other. Note rst that, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention
24The bank may also help them to enforce side contracts, since it gains from such side contracting
when it o¤ers group lending contracts. The next section shows however that the bank would perform
even better if it could both induce the entrepreneurs to monitor each other (i.e., observe each other
e¤orts) and prevent collusion (it could then costlessly ensure that the entrepreneurs report these e¤orts).
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to contracts such that an entrepreneur does not exert e¤ort if he is not monitored by the
other entrepreneur otherwise, the entrepreneur should get a rent at least equal to R.
Let x denote entrepreneur is payment if they both succeed, y the payment if the
other entrepreneur j does not succeed. The entrepreneurs must prefer to exert e¤ort and
monitoring, that outcome to not monitoring (and thus not exerting e¤ort):
p2x^+ p (1  p) y   c    p2x^+ p  1  p y: (4.8)
Maximizing the expected prot of the bank under this constraint leads to

x^ = c+
p2 p2 ; y = 0

.
This contract gives each entrepreneur a rent p
2(c+)
p2 p2 which, under (4:7), is lower than the
minimal rent needed to induce e¤ort with individual contracts (R) which furthermore
ensures that an entrepreneur does not provide e¤ort if not monitored by the other.
Therefore, group lending contracts (adjusted so as to induce mutual monitoring) are
still optimal as long as the cost of monitoring is not too large.
5 Conclusion
The analysis presented above shows that, contrary to previous claims, banks do not
benet from collusion when entrepreneurs can observe each others e¤orts. A more ap-
propriate claim is that information-sharing among the entrepreneurs helps banks even if
the entrepreneurs collude. If the entrepreneurs could observe each others e¤orts but not
collude, banks would do even better and actually achieve the rst best (complete infor-
mation optimum). In other words, and from a banks perspective, information-sharing is
desirable even if it leads to collusion, but collusion per se is not desirable.
The above analysis also shows that simple group lending contracts, based only on real-
ized outputs, achieve better results than individual contracts when entrepreneurs observe
each others e¤orts (but not otherwise); furthermore, the more sophisticated contracts
that are needed to get closer to the rst-best are not robust to collusion between en-
trepreneurs, whereas simple group lending contracts constitute optimal contracts when
entrepreneurs can implement e¢ cient side contracts.
This paper derives lessons that are similar to the ones obtained in adverse selection
environments with correlated types (La¤ont (2003)). In the absence of collusion, group
lending contracts are not the best contracts that banks can design when entrepreneurs
share information. More powerful contracts based on the ideas of yardstick competition
can elicit this common information at a lower cost. However, these contracts are not
robust to collusion while simple group lending contracts, based on partnersproduction
levels, remain robust to collusion.
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The situations of moral hazard and of adverse selection however di¤er in the impact of
collusion. In adverse selection contexts, the motivation for group lending contracts comes
from the fact that information about one entrepreneurs typemay also bring relevant
information about the other entrepreneurs type; as a result, one entrepreneurs output
provides a useful signal about both entrepreneurstypes. The optimal (collusion-proof)
contract can however be quite complex; in particular, it may be useful to rely not only on
the signals provided by the entrepreneursproduction levels, but also on messages directly
sent by the entrepreneurs that is, the optimal contract may require some communication
between the entrepreneurs and their banks. In contrast, in moral hazard environments
where entrepreneurs have no private information ex ante, a bank can no longer gain from
trying to have the e¤orts revealed.25
25In essence, because they observe each others e¤orts, the entrepreneurs behave as a single entity: they
can achieve perfect collusion by dealing with a third party, using appropriate revelation mechanisms if
necessary, when the third party does not directly observe their e¤orts; the situation with side-contracting
is thus formally identical to a situation where one entrepreneur would be in charge of both projects.
Note that in the case of a unique entrepreneur (with one or several projects), the bank could easily
induce this entrepreneur to truthfully report his e¤ort(s) ex post (e.g., by letting the entrepreneur choose
between a safe return and a lottery, contingent on the outcome of the project). However, such revelation
mechanisms cannot be used to reduce the rent that must be promised ex ante to induce the entrepreneur
to exert e¤ort.
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